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WIPO AND THE ACTA THREAT 
 
Sara Bannerman
1
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The new Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) has been seen as a 
potentially existential threat to the existing World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO)—as a new plurilateral institution that could replace 
the older multilateral organization.  The ACTA threat to WIPO has a 
number of predecessors.  WIPO’s centrality to international intellectual 
property norm-setting encountered its first major challenge in 1952 when 
the Universal Copyright Convention was established under UNESCO.  It 
encountered a second major challenge with the establishment of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (the TRIPs 
Agreement).  The ACTA challenge thus potentially represents a third 
instance where a major competing norm-setting institution has challenged 
WIPO.  In this paper I review past instances where WIPO has been 
challenged by an outside norm-setting institution and the responses taken to 
those challenges.  Second, I outline the main proposals for an ACTA 
institution.  Third, drawing on the past instances, I outline the various 
possible forms that an ACTA-WIPO relationship could take, and various 
strategies that WIPO could use to maintain its role in the international 
intellectual property system.  Finally, I outline a number of public policy 
concerns that the institutional proposals for ACTA pose.
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I. BACKGROUND 
 
The longest-standing international institution dealing with intellectual 
property today is the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).  
WIPO is the successor to the United International Bureaux for the 
Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPI), which was established 117 
years ago in 1893.  BIRPI and its successor, WIPO, have functioned for 
over a century as the core of the international intellectual property system, 
administering the fundamental copyright, patent, trademark, and 
neighbouring rights, and other intellectual property treaties. 
WIPO’s leadership in and centrality to the world intellectual property 
system has fallen into question over the past decade.  It has failed to 
accomplish any new international agreements since the WIPO Internet 
Treaties were established in 1997.  This failure has led to the perception in 
some circles that WIPO is not presently leading in the area of intellectual 
property, and that other institutions may have overtaken WIPO as the key 
centres of action.   
One of the challenges currently faced by WIPO comes from a new 
proposed treaty, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA).  ACTA 
has been under negotiation since 2007, with the goal of combating 
counterfeiting and piracy.  Proposed to cover intellectual property 
enforcement, including enforcement at borders and over the Internet, the 
treaty is under negotiation as a plurilateral, rather than a universal, treaty.  
ACTA negotiating parties include Australia, Canada, the European Union 
and its 27 member states, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, the 
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Republic of Korea, Singapore, Switzerland and the United States.2  Some 
commentators have speculated that a new ACTA institution, if founded, 
could present a tremendous challenge to WIPO.  ACTA has been seen as a 
potentially existential threat to WIPO—as a new institution that could 
replace the older organization.3   
The ACTA threat to WIPO has a number of predecessors.  WIPO’s 
centrality to international intellectual property norm-setting encountered its 
first major challenge in 1952 when the Universal Copyright Convention 
was established under UNESCO.  WIPO encountered a second major 
challenge with the establishment of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs).  ACTA thus potentially represents 
a third instance where a major competing norm-setting institution has 
challenged WIPO’s centrality and leadership in the international intellectual 
property system. 
ACTA negotiations have taken place outside of WIPO.  Practical and 
instrumental reasons for this stem in part from the failure of WIPO to make 
significant strides towards new norm-setting, and in part from a desire to 
negotiate ACTA among specific actors, rather than on a broad or universal 
basis.  Some have objected to the circumvention of WIPO.  The European 
Parliament passed a resolution deploring “the calculated choice of the 
parties not to negotiate through well-established international bodies, such 
as WIPO and the World Trade Organization (WTO), which have 
established frameworks for public information and consultation.”4  In what 
was presumably a bid to engage WIPO in ACTA debates, the European 
Parliament requested that WIPO and the WTO prepare reports on their own 
practices of transparency, their current enforcement activities, whether there 
is need for new enforcement activities, the relationship of ACTA to current 
IP norms, and the likely effects of ACTA on flexibilities under the TRIPs 
Agreement.5  The Wellington Declaration, issued by participants at a New 
                                                 
2 Joint Statement: ACTA Final Round, September 23 - October 2, 2010  
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/fo/joint_statement-
finale-declaration_commune.aspx?lang=eng. 
3 See Michael Geist, Toward an ACTA Super-Structure: How ACTA May Replace  
WIPO (March 26, 2010), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4910/99999/.  
4 European Parliament Res. of 10 March 2010 on the transparency and state of play of 
the ACTA negotiations, EUR. PARL. DOC. B7-0154/2010 (2010), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-
TA-2010-0058. 
5 See Kaitlin Mara, WIPO, WTO Requested to Advise on Anti-Counterfeiting Treaty, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (April 15, 2010), http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2010/04/15/european-parliamentarians-call-on-wipo-wto-for-technical-
advice-on-acta/.  See also Lamy tells EU Parliament No (For Now) on ACTA, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPRTY WATCH (May 13, 2010), http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2010/05/13/lamy-tells-eu-parliament-no-for-now-on-acta/ (reporting that 
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Zealand forum on ACTA just prior to the New Zealand round of ACTA 
negotiations, also called WIPO the preferable forum for IP negotiations:  
 
We note that the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation has public, inclusive and transparent processes 
for negotiating multilateral agreements on (and a committee 
dedicated to the enforcement of) copyright, trademark and 
patent rights, and thus we affirm that WIPO is a preferable 
forum for the negotiation of substantive provisions 
affecting these matters.6 
 
WIPO has retained a public distance from ACTA, refraining from 
comment on the negotiations until recently.  Francis Gurry, the Director-
General of WIPO, originally stated that he had not read the agreement and 
knew little about ACTA.7  However, he has since made several statements.  
In October 2009 he was reported as having commented, “‘Naturally we 
prefer open, transparent international processes to arrive at conclusions that 
are of concern to the whole world,’ he said, citing WIPO’s role as an 
international, United Nations agency.  And, he added, ‘IP is of concern to 
the whole world.’”8  More recently, in May 2010, Gurry responded to the 
letter from the European Parliament: 
 
[Y]our letter raises the question of possible co-operation 
between WIPO and a future ACTA Secretariat.  Generally, 
international cooperation is one of the key pillars of WIPO's 
work in the field of IP enforcement, and the WIPO 
Secretariat maintains close cooperation with a large number 
of international IGOs and NGOs throughout its 
enforcement-related activities. [. . .] 
I should like to reiterate, however, that WIPO has not 
participated in any capacity in the ACTA negotiations, nor 
have there been consultations between the WIPO 
Secretariat and the ACTA negotiating parties at any stage.  
We therefore do not have any information as to the 
                                                                                                                            
the WTO has declined to prepare such a report). 
6 The Wellington Declaration, PublicACTA Blog (Apr. 11, 2010, 3:21 PM), 
http://publicacta.org.nz/wellington-declaration/#more-330.  
7 See Mara, supra note 5. 
8 Kaitlin Mara, Perpetual Protection Of Traditional Knowledge “Not On Table” At 
WIPO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (Oct. 22, 2009, 4:01 PM), http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2009/10/22/perpetual-protection-of-traditional-knowledge-
%E2%80%9Cnot-on-table%E2%80%9D-at-wipo/. 
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objectives of the parties, including the potential role of 
international organizations in a future ACTA Secretariat.  
To date, WIPO has not been approached or received any 
request concerning such co-operation and again, the 
Organization's response would be guided by the decisions 
of its Member States.9  
 
In June 2010, in more direct public comments, Gurry called ACTA a 
“bad development” for WIPO—an example of the difficulty faced by WIPO 
and other UN agencies in addressing issues and concluding agreements.  “A 
number of countries feel [there is] an important area of public policy they 
are not able to address in a multilateral forum, and so have gone outside the 
multilateral framework to satisfy their desire for creating some form of 
‘international’ cooperation,” he said.  The challenge, according to Gurry, is 
how to make the multilateral system relevant.10 
 
II. WIPO:  THE INSTITUTION 
  
WIPO was founded in 1970, when the 1967 Convention Establishing 
the World Intellectual Property Organization came into effect.11  The 
organization took over from its predecessor, BIRPI, which had acted as a 
combined secretariat for several international intellectual property treaties 
since 1893.  Several years later, in 1974, WIPO became a specialized 
agency of the United Nations (UN).  BIRPI was originally a European-
dominated organization that had always sought to expand, especially into 
the United States.  In the 1970s WIPO strove to become a truly universal 
organization.  This effort was helped along when, in 1994, the World Trade 
Organization Agreement required adherence to key WIPO-administered 
treaties.  Membership expanded, and WIPO now encompasses 164 member 
states.12 
WIPO’s key functions include the administration of intellectual property 
                                                 
9 Letter from Francis Gurry, Director General of WIPO, to Members of European 
Parliament (May 6, 2010), available at http://en.act-on-
acta.eu/Greens_EFA_MEPs_letter_to_WIPO_and_WTO/Answer_from_WIPO.  
10 Catherine Saez, ACTA A Sign Of Weakness In Multilateral System, WIPO Head 
Says, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (June 30, 2010, 6:18 PM), http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2010/06/30/acta-a-sign-of-weakness-in-multilateral-system-wipo-head-
says/.  
11 See Christopher May, The World Intellectual Property Organization, 11(3) New 
Pol. Econ. 435 (2006). 
12 See World Intellectual Property Organization Member States, 
http://www.wipo.int/members/en/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2010). 
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systems, such as processing patent applications under the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) and international trademark applications under 
the Madrid System; the provision of technical assistance to help member 
states build their capacity to protect and regulate intellectual property; and 
international intellectual property norm-setting, including the initiation of 
new treaties and the revision of old ones.   
BIRPI was established as a simple secretariat in Berne with several staff 
members.  Over the past 117 years, it has expanded into a large 
international institution.  WIPO is now based at a complex in Geneva.  It 
has offices in New York, Rio de Janeiro, Singapore, and Tokyo.13  Regional 
bureaus within WIPO coordinate and facilitate technical assistance to 
Africa, the Arab countries, Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America and the 
Caribbean.14  Since 1998 WIPO has operated the WIPO Academy, which 
offers training and professional development programs on IP in English, 
Arabic, Chinese, French, Portuguese, Russian and Spanish, including 
various Master of IP Law programs that are run in partnership with outside 
universities.  Hundreds of students circulate through WIPO Academy 
programs each year.15  Other services provided by the organization include 
public outreach activities, the publication of WIPO Magazine, and the 
hosting of events and conferences around the world. 
74% of WIPO’s funding comes from PCT fees, and another 16% of its 
funding comes from other fees under the various treaties it administers.  The 
remaining 10% comes from member state contributions and other income.  
WIPO’s total income figures at 314 million Swiss francs ($311 million in 
today’s USD), with staff expenditures of 194 million Swiss francs ($192 
million in today’s USD) and non-staff expenditures of 87 million Swiss 
francs ($86 million USD today).16   
 
III. THE UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION 
 
BIRPI encountered its first outside competing norm-setting institution in 
1952 when the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC) was established 
under the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO).  Unlike ACTA, the UCC established lower rather than higher 
levels of copyright protection.  The UCC was therefore attractive to 
developing countries for whom international copyright obligations created a 
                                                 
13 See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WORLD INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION: AN OVERVIEW 6 (2009). 
14 See id. at 27. 
15 See id. at 31. 
16 See id. at 50-51. 
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net outflow of revenue.  It was also attractive to the United States who, for 
sixty-six years, had refused to join the Berne Convention, finding a number 
of its requirements unsuitable to the American situation.  The UCC quickly 
garnered a broad and powerful membership, including, most prominently, 
the United States.   
The UCC was a threat to BIRPI on a number of levels.  Though not an 
existential threat to the organization, the UCC challenged what were viewed 
as the high copyright standards that BIRPI represented, as well as the 
breadth of the membership of BIRPI’s copyright treaty.  In the years 
between 1967 and 1971, the fundamental question of whether BIRPI/WIPO 
would continue to attempt to achieve universal membership, or whether it 
would cede parts of the world to its competitor, was answered.  Two options 
were on the table:  BIRPI/WIPO could come to an arrangement with the 
UCC that would allow BIRPI/WIPO to continue to attempt to achieve 
universal membership, or the organization could instead cater to a more 
restricted membership, consisting of only those countries who wished to 
maintain the higher levels of copyright mandated by the Berne Convention.  
In the latter case, the Universal Copyright Convention would provide an 
alternative set of copyright norms catering to developing countries and the 
United States, perhaps to act as a stepping stone for those countries’ 
eventual accession to the Berne Convention.17   
BIRPI, and later WIPO, chose to come to an arrangement with the UCC 
that would allow the two organizations to work together and to neutralize 
the UCC threat to WIPO’s membership and norms.  To achieve this goal, a 
number of steps were taken.  The two organizations held joint meetings of 
their oversight bodies in order to share information, representation, and 
plans.  In 1971 the threat of the UCC was further neutralized when the two 
conventions were simultaneously revised in a way that made their 
provisions aimed at developing countries similar enough to eliminate the 
temptation for a developing country to join one convention but not the 
other.  Provisions were also added to the agreement that would effectively 
eliminate the possibility of developed countries from denouncing the Berne 
Convention in favour of the UCC.18  The UCC came to be conceptualized 
as a bridge leading to ultimate adherence to the Berne Convention.19 
In 1967, when the convention that would establish the World 
                                                 
17 Charles F. Johnson, The Origins of the Stockholm Protocol, 18 BULL. OF THE 
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y OF THE U.S. 91, 92 (1970). 
18 See Universal Copyright Convention, art. 17, July 24, 1971, 943 U.N.T.S. 178.  See 
also 2 SAM RICKETSON & JANE GINSBURG, INT’L COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS:  
THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND §§ 18.27–37 (2d ed. 2006). 
19 See Orrin G. Hatch, Better Late than Never:  Implementation of the 1886 Berne 
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Intellectual Property Organization as a successor to BIRPI was signed, the 
WIPO was given a new and broad mandate.  When the WIPO Convention 
came into effect in 1970, a number of new functions would ensure that the 
organization had a continuing mandate.   
 
IV. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
 
The TRIPs Agreement was also perceived as a threat to WIPO.  The 
United States, by 1986, had grown frustrated with its inability to increase 
levels of intellectual property under WIPO and with the absence of an 
effective WIPO enforcement mechanism.  WIPO was seen as identifying 
too strongly with the interests of developing countries, who held a majority 
in the organization.  That year, the U.S. shifted its IP treaty-making efforts 
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).20 
A 1995 Agreement between the World Intellectual Property 
Organization and the World Trade Organization established a framework 
that would ensure cooperative relations between WIPO and the WTO.  That 
agreement ensures cooperative use of resources (laws & regulations, 
databases), cooperative provision of technical assistance, and regular 
contact and exchange of information between the two organizations.  As 
Professor Laurence Helfer notes:  
 
[T]he WTO did not supplant WIPO as the principal 
intergovernmental organization devoted to intellectual 
property lawmaking.  TRIPs itself implicitly acknowledges 
the continuing importance of WIPO as a forum for 
negotiating treaties, particularly those embodying “higher 
levels of protection of intellectual property rights.”  In 
addition, a 1995 agreement between WIPO and the WTO 
requires each organization to provide technical and legal 
assistance to developing countries, delegates to WIPO 
certain administrative functions in TRIPs, and enhances 
information sharing about national intellectual property 
laws.   
Seen from this perspective, the shift from WIPO to 
GATT to TRIPs was not intended to eclipse WIPO.  . . . 
Whereas the WTO emphasized implementation, 
enforcement, and dispute settlement, WIPO focused on 
                                                                                                                            
Convention, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 171, 177 (1989). 
20 See Susan K. Sell, Private Power, Public Law 46, 105 (2003).  
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generating new forms of intellectual property protection, 
administering existing intellectual property agreements, and 
providing technical assistance to developing countries.21 
 
The WIPO Development Agenda, established in 2007, has further 
entrenched the cooperative relationship between the two organizations.  
Recommendation 14 of the Development Agenda calls on WIPO to provide 
advice to developing countries on the implementation of TRIPs: 
 
Within the framework of the agreement between WIPO 
and the WTO, WIPO shall make available advice to 
developing countries and LDCs, on the implementation and 
operation of the rights and obligations and the 
understanding and use of flexibilities contained in the 
TRIPS Agreement.22 
 
The Development Agenda also cites TRIPs as a guideline for 
WIPO’s activities: 
 
45. To approach intellectual property enforcement in 
the context of broader societal interests and especially 
development-oriented concerns, with a view that “the 
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights 
should contribute to the promotion of technological 
innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users 
of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to 
social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and 
obligations”, in accordance with Article 7 of the TRIPS 
Agreement.23 
 
Although initially perceived as a threat, TRIPs and WIPO became 
complimentary institutions.24  At the same time, the advent of TRIPs may 
                                                 
21 Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting:  The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of 
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking 29 YALE J. INT’L. L. 1, 25 (2004). 
22 World Intellectual Property Organization, The 45 Adopted Recommendations under 
the WIPO Development Agenda 2 (2007), http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-
development/en/agenda/recommendations.pdf. 
23 Id. at 5. 
24 See Frederick Abbott, Distributed Governance at the WTO-WIPO: An Evolving 
Model for Open-Architecture Integrated Governance, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 63, 63-81 (2000).  
Abbott holds up the cooperation between WIPO and the WTO as a positive example of 
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have shifted perceptions of WIPO, such that the organization came to be 
viewed to a greater extent as serving administrative and technical assistance 
functions. 
 
V. ACTA: INSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS 
 
Discussions about institutional arrangements for ACTA date back to 
March of 2008, when Canada volunteered to write a non-paper outlining the 
various options for an ACTA institution, for consideration by negotiating 
partners.25  Since the leak of the Canadian non-paper, various draft texts of 
ACTA have become available, as has a near-final official text resulting 
from the Tokyo round of negotiations in October 2010.  ACTA includes a 
section on institutional arrangements.26  
In general, the parties to the agreement appear to envision a very simple 
and limited institutional structure.  Japan, for example, suggested that “[i]n 
order to avoid excessive burden of finance on human resources of the 
Parties, the institutional structure of the ACTA should be as simple as 
possible.  The provisions concerning institutional structure should be 
limited to such as may be truly needed.”27  The ACTA text states that the 
ACTA Committee “shall strive to avoid unnecessary duplication of other 
international efforts regarding the enforcement of intellectual property 
rights,”28 and that Parties conducting capacity building and technical 
assistance under ACTA “shall strive to avoid unnecessary 
duplication…with respect to other international efforts.”29  The preamble 
notes the desire of the Parties that “ACTA operate in a manner mutually 
supportive of international enforcement work and cooperation conducted 
                                                                                                                            
distributed governance.   
25 See CANADA – ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT (ACTA) NON-PAPER ON 
INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES UNDER THE AGREEMENT, PIJIP IP ENFORCEMENT DATABASE, 
http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (scroll down to “2008” and follow “Canada 
– Non-Paper on Institutional Issues” hyperlink) [hereinafter CANADA NON-PAPER]. 
26 See, e.g., Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Consolidated Text, art. 5, PIJIP IP 
ENFORCEMENT DATABASE, http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow 
“Official Text - October 2, 2010” hyperlink) [hereinafter ACTA Text – Oct. 2, 2010], and 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Informal Predecisional/Deliberative Draft:  Jul. 1, 
2010, art. 5, PIJIP IP ENFORCEMENT DATABASE, 
http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow “Full Leaked Text Dated July 1, 
2010” hyperlink) [hereinafter ACTA Draft – Jul 1, 2010]. 
27 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Informal Predecisional/Deliberative Draft:  
Jan. 18, 2010 Consolidated Text, art. 5, PIJIP IP ENFORCEMENT DATABASE, 
http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow “Full Leaked Text Dated March 
18, 2010” hyperlink) [hereinafter ACTA Draft – Jan. 18, 2010]. 
28 See ACTA Text – Oct. 2, 2010, supra note 26, art. 5.1 ¶ 8. 
29 See id. art. 4.3, ¶ 3. 
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within relevant international organizations.”30 
In past discussions regarding the location of the institution and whether 
it would function as a stand-alone entity, some parties, including the EU, 
proposed that ACTA should make use of an existing international 
organization, likely in Geneva, to provide secretariat services.  Korea and 
Morocco preferred this option, with Korea’s preferred international 
organization being the WTO and Morocco’s being WIPO.31  Some 
preferred that ACTA would remain autonomous, perhaps with a secretariat 
provided on a rotating basis by member states.  According to the text of 
ACTA, rules regarding the hosting and chairing of ACTA meetings will be 
decided according to the ACTA rules and procedures, to be set within a 
reasonable period of time after the entry into force of ACTA.32  The text 
does not specify the use of WIPO or the WTO as a secretariat. 
The ACTA text establishes an ACTA Committee comprised of one 
representative from each contracting state.33  This committee will have four 
main functions:  1) to review the implementation and operation of the 
agreement (this could be done on a regular, pre-determined rotating basis, 
or on an ad hoc basis at the request of a party to the agreement34); 2) to 
consider matters concerning the development of the agreement and 
amendments thereto; 3) to approve the terms of accession to the Agreement 
for those seeking to become Party to the agreement; and 4) to consider any 
other matter that may affect the operation of the agreement.35  The 
committee is also empowered to set up ad hoc committees and working 
groups; assist non-party governments in acceding to the agreement on 
request; seek advice from non-governmental persons or groups; make 
recommendations, provide information, and share or endorse best practices 
on the implementation and operation of the agreement and on reducing 
intellectual property rights infringement, including techniques for 
identifying and monitoring piracy and counterfeiting; and other tasks as 
                                                 
30 See id., Preamble. 
31 See ACTA Draft – Jan. 18, 2010, supra note 27, art. 5.2, ¶ 1. 
32 See ACTA Text – Oct 2, 2010, supra note 26, art. 5.1, ¶ 4(a). 
33 The Canadian non-paper suggested a smaller membership of this body:  
“Negotiating partners may also wish to consider how best to coordinate issues among a 
larger Council. It is noted that the number of Parties may increase significantly, as 
accession is granted to additional countries.  As such, another option might be to appoint a 
smaller group of Parties to the Council, on either a permanent or rotating basis.”  CANADA 
NON-PAPER, supra note 25, at 2.  Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand appear to support 
a full membership on this body.  See ACTA Draft – Jan. 18, 2010, supra note 27, art. 5.1, ¶ 
1.  The ACTA text states that “The Parties hereby establish the ACTA Committee and each 
Party shall be represented on that Committee.”  ACTA Text – Oct. 2, 2010, supra note 26, 
art. 5.1, ¶ 1.    
34 CANADA NON-PAPER, supra note 25, at 4. 
35 See ACTA Text – Oct. 2, 2010, supra note 26, art. 5.1, ¶ 2. 
12 WIPO and the ACTA Threat 
 WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP 
decided by the parties.36  The committee will generally meet once a year.37  
The chair of the committee could rotate between states, but decisions 
regarding specific processes for selection of chairs have not yet been taken.     
Provisions within the draft texts with regard to the admission of 
observers to ACTA meetings have been dropped, leaving decisions with 
regard to the admission of observers to the rules and procedures of the 
ACTA Committee.38     
   
VI. SCENARIOS 
 
Regarding the future relationship between ACTA and WIPO, there are 
three main possibilities.  First, it is possible that no formal relationship will 
be established between the two institutions.  There are no public indications 
that a formal relationship is, as of yet, on the agenda, and the ACTA text 
seems to envision ACTA as a stand-alone entity.  Second, a formal ACTA-
WIPO relationship could be established on some level.  This could be a 
formal agreement between the two bodies that might, as in past cases, 
involve some level of information and/or service sharing.  WIPO could 
agree to perform technical assistance and informational functions for ACTA 
(maintaining information on the laws and regulations of various countries, 
for example).  The WIPO Development Agenda could be used as a tool for 
assisting developing countries to implement ACTA.  The third former 
possibility was that ACTA and WIPO could, on some level, merge.  The 
possibility was initially raised that WIPO could house an ACTA secretariat 
or provide secretariat services to ACTA.39  This possibility was dropped 
from the ACTA text. 
 In terms of the stature of the two organizations, there are four main 
possibilities.  First, it is possible that the ACTA initiative will decline or fail 
to come into force.  International IP agreements have been notoriously hard 
to realize, especially where issues are contentious.  ACTA remains 
controversial and is opposed by significant groups.  ACTA could also fail if 
it fails to achieve the minimum number of ratifications, acceptances, and 
approvals to come into force.40  A second possibility is, as some 
commentators have suggested, that WIPO’s stature could decline.  It seems 
most likely that this decline would be a simple decline in stature as a result 
                                                 
36 See id. art. 5.1, ¶ 3. 
37 See id. art. 5.1, ¶ 6. 
38 See id. art. 5.1, ¶ 4.  
39 See ACTA Draft – Jan. 18, 2010, supra note 27, art. 5.2 ¶ 1. 
40 The minimum number of accessions, according to the most recent leaked text, is six. 
See ACTA Text – Oct. 2, 2010, supra note 26, art. 6.2, ¶ 1. 
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of a failure to achieve new treaties, while the organization continued to 
perform its other functions.  WIPO could come to be seen, to a greater 
extent, as primarily a technical assistance agency and administrative hub.  It 
is also possible, but less likely, that other organizations such as ACTA 
could take over or take precedence in those functions as well.  This seems 
like a long-term threat, since the ACTA text appears to envision a small 
institution with limited responsibilities; negotiating parties to ACTA are 
concerned not to incur undue cost and seem to wish to avoid duplication of 
functions amongst organizations.  On the other hand, ACTA does 
encompass the provision of technical assistance, requiring each Party to 
provide technical assistance and work closely with other parties.  This, 
however, relates only to technical assistance provided to Parties to the 
Agreement and prospective Parties to the Agreement, under the proviso that 
“[e]ach Party shall strive to avoid unnecessary duplication of the activities 
described in this Article with respect to other international efforts.”41  Third, 
it is possible that both ACTA and WIPO could go into decline as a result 
perhaps of changing attitudes towards IP or changing geopolitics and new 
innovation models.  Finally, it is possible, as I have suggested, that neither 
WIPO nor ACTA will decline, but that the two institutions will come to an 
arrangement that sees both take on important roles in the international IP 
system. 
 
VII. STRATEGIES 
 
 A number of strategies have historically been employed in order to 
ensure that WIPO maintains a role and a significant stature at the core of the 
international IP system.  These include efforts to portray WIPO and its 
treaties as the highest standard in intellectual property norm-setting, as was 
done when the Universal Copyright Convention competed with BIRPI’s 
Berne Convention, portrayed as the gold standard of intellectual property.  
WIPO can now draw on its status as a broad-based multilateral organization 
in its self-portrayal as the most legitimate forum for IP norm-setting.  A 
number of strategies have also been employed to ensure that WIPO works 
in harmony with outside IP organizations, turning competition into 
collaboration and ensuring that each organization has a role or niche in the 
international intellectual property system.  Such strategies include hosting 
joint or co-located meetings and assemblies, as well as informal or 
formalized information and service sharing.  Such strategies have shaped 
treaty language itself, where treaties laid out complementary roles, or have 
                                                 
41 See id. art.4.3 ¶ 1-3. 
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been revised to resemble each other enough to invite dual membership, 
rather than membership in just one of the two treaties.   Language has also 
been included that has made it in effect impossible to exit one treaty in 
favour of another.  Competing international organizations based in the same 
epistemic community often share an interest in collaborating, carving out 
niches, and mutually ensuring each other’s legitimacy. 
 
VIII. CONCERNS 
 
While the decline or disappearance of WIPO as a result of the 
ACTA threat seems unlikely, important concerns remain.  If a plurilateral 
organization becomes the primary locus of intellectual property normsetting 
among some countries, the international intellectual property system could 
fracture.  Core norms contained in WIPO and WTO treaties could unify the 
system at a basic level, but a variety of differing norms and institutions 
might govern other areas.  Although a source of complexity and perhaps 
uncertainty, such a scenario might bring a measure of policy innovation and 
competing norms to the international intellectual property system.42 
The biggest question is whether ACTA will have a formal 
secretariat.  While the ACTA text does not provide for a secretariat, this 
does not preclude the possibility of formal offices being established in the 
future.  A secretariat could provide the continuity and resources necessary 
to build and maintain ACTA into a true competitor to WIPO.43   
The breadth of membership on the governing body of ACTA is of 
prime importance to the ability of parties to the agreement to have influence 
on the functioning of the ACTA institution and to guide future revisions of 
the agreement.  A broader or full membership on this body, or transparent 
rules surrounding decisions on membership that would see all parties, at one 
point or another, included, would be of particular benefit to the less 
powerful parties to the agreement.  The conditions upon which outsiders 
might become a party to the agreement and to gain a seat on the steering 
body of ACTA should also be of interest to outsiders.   
The question of the location of an ACTA secretariat or ACTA 
meetings has important implications.  If a secretariat were housed at 
multilateral organizations like WIPO or the WTO in Geneva, there might be 
                                                 
42 See Laurence R. Helfer, Mediating Interactions in an Expanding International 
Intellectual Property Regime, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 123 (2004). 
43
 It has been suggested that the Inter-American copyright system ultimately went into 
decline because of the absence of a secretariat that might have paved a smoother and more 
tenable multilateral system.  See STEPHEN P. LADAS, 1 THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 
OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY 636; SILKE VON LEWINSKI, INTERNATIONAL 
COPYRIGHT LAW AND POLICY 79 (2008). 
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a greater likelihood of broader engagement with ACTA, both by parties to 
the agreement and observers, as a simple result of location.  Such an 
arrangement would signify a higher level of collaboration and support 
between ACTA and the institution with which it was housed.  Both 
engagement and collaboration could have a variety of effects that deserve 
further consideration.  The provision of secretariat services by parties to the 
agreement, rather than by an independent office, might signify a more 
modest and frugal approach by ACTA parties, and a greater confidence in 
organizations like WIPO to provide technical assistance.   If secretariat 
services are provided by parties to the agreement on a rotating basis, this 
could provide the hosting parties with significant agenda-setting 
opportunities.   
Possible formal arrangements between ACTA and outside treaties 
and institutions could have a strong impact on the future revision of and 
implementation of ACTA, and other international IP agreements’ future 
relationship to ACTA, including the ability of outside agreements and 
institutions to manoeuvre with, around, and potentially against ACTA.  
Such formal arrangements should be of high concern to those interested in 
the future of the international IP system.  
The transparency of the governing body of ACTA to non-party 
states and NGOs is also an important concern.  Admission of observers is 
an issue of importance to the legitimacy and stature of the institution, its 
responsiveness to outside concerns and developments, and to outside parties 
affected by the agreement.   
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
 
 ACTA could potentially threaten, to some extent, WIPO’s place in 
areas such as treaty-making and technical assistance, and as a result, 
WIPO’s overall stature in the international intellectual property system.  
However, ACTA is not an existential threat to WIPO, and the institutional 
basis for ACTA appears to be, at the present time, envisioned on a relatively 
small scale that leaves room for the continuing work of - and work with - 
other international organizations, including WIPO.  It seems likely, based 
on past experience, that WIPO will carve out a continuing niche for itself in 
the areas of administration and technical assistance, and that cooperation 
between the two organizations could be established.    Should this happen, 
the result may be that the international intellectual property system will 
consist of a large international institution with significant resources in the 
area of administration, promotion, and technical  assistance in intellectual 
property (WIPO), alongside a small group of powers with little transparency 
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leading in the area of treaty-making.  It is possible that WIPO, as a large 
and relatively legitimate organization, will be enlisted in the 
implementation of ACTA, effectively supporting the norms created by the 
smaller and non-transparent body.  This scenario raises important concerns.  
The structure, control, and transparency of ACTA, as well as its potential 
relationship to WIPO, should be of prime concern to those who wish to 
influence the architecture of the international IP system in the years ahead. 
